Hungary drops veto on 27 EU’s eight sanctioned individuals of Russia sanctions

Aleksander8 hours ago

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Hungary has recently agreed to drop its veto on the European Union’s sanctions against Russia, ensuring their renewal. This decision came after negotiations where the EU agreed to remove several names from the sanctions list, addressing Hungary’s concerns. The sanctions, which include travel bans and asset freezes, were set to expire but will now continue for another six months.

The EU has imposed sanctions on Russia due to its actions in Ukraine, affecting over 2,400 individuals and entities. These measures need unanimous renewal every six months by all 27 EU member states, making Hungary’s potential veto a significant hurdle. Hungary, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has often criticized these sanctions, citing economic impacts and energy security concerns.

Table of Contents

Hungary’s Demands and Compromise

Hungary initially demanded the removal of eight sanctioned individuals, including Russian oligarchs like Mikhail Fridman, Alisher Usmanov, and Petr Aven. After negotiations, the EU agreed to de-list four Russian individuals—Moshe Kantor, Mikhail Degtyarev, Vladimir Rashevsky, and Gulbahor Imailova (sister of Usmanov)—and three deceased persons. Notably, Fridman remains on the list, suggesting Hungary settled for partial concessions. This compromise was reached on March 14, 2025, just before the deadline, avoiding a potential collapse of the sanctions regime.

An unexpected aspect is that Hungary accepted the deal despite not getting Fridman removed, possibly due to pressure from other EU members or additional assurances, though not explicitly stated.

Background on EU Sanctions and Current Status

The European Union has imposed a series of sanctions on Russia in response to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These sanctions include travel bans, asset freezes, and sectoral restrictions aimed at limiting Russia’s ability to fund its military activities. The measures target over 2,400 individuals and entities, primarily from Russia, and are renewed every six months by unanimous agreement of all 27 EU member states. This unanimity requirement means that any single country can veto the renewal, creating a potential point of leverage for member states with differing views.

The current sanctions were set to expire, creating a tight deadline for renewal. Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has been a vocal critic of these sanctions, arguing that they harm the EU economy and Hungary’s energy security. Hungary’s reliance on Russian energy, particularly through the Paks nuclear power plant and gas supplies, has often been cited as a reason for its stance. Previous instances, such as in January 2025, saw Hungary threaten to veto sanctions over energy concerns, eventually relenting after securing assurances (Euronews Hungary backs down from veto threat and allows renewal of EU sanctions on Russia).

Hungary’s Demands and Initial Stance

In the lead-up to the March 2025 renewal, Hungary threatened to block the extension unless certain conditions were met. Specifically, Hungary demanded the removal of eight sanctioned individuals from the list, including prominent Russian oligarchs Mikhail Fridman, Alisher Usmanov, and Petr Aven. These individuals are key figures in Russian business and politics, with Fridman known for his involvement in Alfa Group, which has interests in banking, oil, and telecommunications, and Usmanov being a major shareholder in various industries. Aven, former CEO of Alfa Bank, is also linked to Fridman.

The reasons behind Hungary’s demands are not fully detailed in the article, but it is speculated that Hungary may have business ties with these oligarchs or believes their inclusion on the list is unwarranted. Fridman, for instance, has been living in London and has been involved in legal battles regarding his sanctions status, including a lawsuit against Luxembourg for $15.8 billion in losses (POLITICO Hungary backs down in EU Russia sanctions standoff). This legal action might have influenced Hungary’s stance, though it’s not explicitly stated.

Hungary’s veto threat was confirmed several times during the week, with unsuccessful negotiation attempts on Monday, Wednesday, and Thursday, as reported by Euronews Hungary drops veto and agrees to prolong EU sanctions on Russia. The clock was ticking fast, with the sanctions set to expire by midnight on Saturday, March 15, 2025, creating a situation of extraordinary suspense for the bloc.

Negotiation Process and Compromise

After intense haggling, EU ambassadors reached a compromise on Friday, March 14, 2025, less than 48 hours before the deadline. The compromise involved de-listing four Russian individuals and removing three recently deceased persons from the sanctions list. The individuals removed include:

Moshe Kantor: A Russian billionaire and president of the European Jewish Congress, sanctioned for supporting Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Mikhail Degtyarev: Former governor of Khabarovsk Krai, sanctioned for his role in annexing Ukrainian territory.
Vladimir Rashevsky: A Russian businessman whose case was considered legally weak, with the agreement to remove his name taken last week with little dispute.
Gulbahor Imailova: Sister of oligarch Alisher Usmanov, likely sanctioned due to her association with him.

The three deceased persons removed are not specified in the article, but their removal is straightforward as they no longer pose a threat.

Notably, Mikhail Fridman, whom Hungary had initially sought to remove, remains on the sanctions list. This is a significant point, as it suggests that Hungary did not achieve its primary demand regarding Fridman. The article mentions that Rashevsky’s case was considered weak legally, which might have made his removal less controversial, and Imailova’s removal could be seen as a concession related to Usmanov, another name Hungary wanted removed.

The decision to remove these names was likely a strategic move to satisfy Hungary’s demands while maintaining the integrity of the sanctions regime. The article does not mention any additional assurances or side deals, such as those related to energy security seen in January 2025, suggesting that the compromise was solely based on the de-listing of names.

Why Hungary Relented

The exact reasons behind Hungary’s decision to drop its veto despite not getting Fridman removed are not fully disclosed. Several factors may have influenced this decision:

Pressure from EU Partners: Other EU member states, particularly Ukraine’s allies like the Baltic states, likely exerted diplomatic pressure on Hungary to avoid a collapse of the sanctions regime. The potential lapse of sanctions could have been seen as a significant victory for Russia, weakening the EU’s stance (Carnegie Endowment Suspend Hungary’s Voting Rights to Save the EU’s Credibility).
Partial Concessions: By removing some names from the list, the EU may have satisfied part of Hungary’s demands, making it politically feasible for Orbán’s government to back down. The removal of Kantor, Degtyarev, Rashevsky, and Imailova, along with the deceased persons, might have been seen as sufficient to justify dropping the veto.
Timing and Deadline Pressure: With the deadline approaching, Hungary may have realized that holding out could isolate it further within the EU, especially given the criticism it has faced for its pro-Russia stance in the past (Euronews ‘Playing with fire’: Orbán’s sanctions veto threat puts Brussels on edge).

An unexpected aspect is that Hungary accepted the deal despite not getting Fridman removed, possibly due to these pressures or additional behind-the-scenes negotiations not detailed in the article. This highlights the complexity of EU decision-making, where national interests must be balanced against collective action.

Implications and Reactions

This episode underscores the fragility of the EU’s unanimity requirement for sanctions renewal and the potential for individual member states to leverage their veto power for national interests. The compromise may set a precedent for future negotiations, where member states could demand similar concessions, potentially weakening the sanctions regime over time.

For the EU, maintaining unity is crucial to present a strong front against Russia. The ability to renew sanctions despite internal dissent demonstrates the bloc’s resilience, but it also exposes vulnerabilities that Russia could exploit. Ukraine’s allies, including the Baltic states, are likely relieved by the renewal, as it ensures continued pressure on Russia, especially before potential ceasefire talks mediated by the US (POLITICO Hungary teases veto over new EU Russian gas sanctions).

From a geopolitical perspective, the renewal ensures that the EU continues to exert economic pressure on Russia through these measures, supporting Ukraine’s defense efforts. However, any perceived weakening of the sanctions or delays in their renewal could be interpreted by Russia as a sign of division within the EU, potentially encouraging further aggression. Hungary’s actions have also drawn criticism, with some calling for reforms to the unanimity rule to prevent such standoffs (Reuters Hungary will veto EU sanctions on Russian nuclear energy, PM Orban says).

Table: Summary of Key Events and Reactions

Event	Details
Hungary’s Initial Demand	Sought removal of eight sanctioned individuals, including Fridman, Usmanov, Aven.
Compromise Reached	De-listed four Russians (Kantor, Degtyarev, Rashevsky, Imailova) and three deceased.
Fridman’s Status	Remains on the sanctions list, despite Hungary’s demand for his removal.
Negotiation Timeline	Final agreement on March 14, 2025, after failed attempts earlier in the week.
Implications	Highlights EU unity challenges, potential precedent for future negotiations.

Discussion

This development marks a critical moment for EU cohesion and its policy towards Russia. Hungary’s ability to extract concessions, even partial ones, underscores the tension between national interests and collective security. The removal of names like Kantor and Degtyarev, while not major oligarchs like Fridman, may still be seen as a victory for Hungary, reflecting Orbán’s strategy of leveraging veto power. The ongoing debate about reforming the unanimity rule, as seen in discussions about suspending Hungary’s voting rights, suggests that this issue may persist (Carnegie Endowment Suspend Hungary’s Voting Rights to Save the EU’s Credibility).

Conclusion

In conclusion, Hungary’s decision to drop its veto on the EU’s Russia sanctions renewal, after securing the removal of several names from the list, marks a temporary resolution to a recurring issue. The EU must find ways to address the concerns of member states like Hungary while maintaining a robust and unified sanctions policy. As the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, the balance between national interests and collective security will remain a critical challenge for the EU, especially with the potential for future veto threats looming.